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Detection of Biological Agents Used for Terrorism: Are We Ready?

Countering the use of biological agents (biothreats) requires a complex network of intelligence, detectors, laboratories, and the personnel and facilities to treat exposed individuals. In October 2009, 8 years after the mailing of letters containing Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released an interim report asserting that the US is failing to address biological weapon proliferation and biological terrorism. The Commission Vice Chairman, Jim Talent, stated in that report that "It is only getting easier and cheaper to develop and use biological weapons—and our best defense is to mitigate the effects through faster, safer vaccines and therapeutics." It is important to remember, however, that the decisions to administer vaccines and therapeutics require robust tools for the detection and identification of biological agents. The capabilities of current detection technology have been a limiting factor in creating a thorough process to deal with biological threats, and the matter is complicated even further by the almost infinite types of sample matrices and potential contaminants that confound analytical processes. Although technology and capabilities have improved since 2001, the majority of available devices are still based on chromatographic immunoassays, PCR, and ELISA. Newer, potentially faster and more sensitive technologies based on concepts such as nanowires, quantum dots, microcantilevers, and hand-held spectrometers are reported to be available or near availability, but most still require significant amounts of testing and validation under conditions replicating actual use. In this Q&A, 3 experts in the field of bioweapon detection answer questions about the current status of biothreat detection technology.

From your perspective, please explain the difference between biothreat detection and biothreat identification.

Mark Hollis² : Biothreat detection can happen in 2 ways: (1) people, animals, and/or plants fall ill in such a pattern that a biothreat can be suspected, and/or (2) the biothreat is identified via one . . . [Full Text of this Article]

What are the current predominant technologies or methods used to identify those biothreats—both in the field, like what first-responders would use, and also perhaps in a public health laboratory at a higher technology level?

From a strategic standpoint, a system to counter a biological attack would be based on a "detect to warn" principle. Please explain the idea of detect to warn, and do we have this capability today?

One aspect of the response to prevent bioterrorism has been the fielding of "kits" for first responders (firefighters, police, etc.) to test for the presence of and identify biothreat agents. How good are these kits, and do they really provide a robust system to detect and identify a biological threat?

Following the 2001 Anthrax attacks there have been several "new" technologies touted to solve the complex problem of biothreat identification. Yet 8 years later few if any of these seem to be commercially available. Why do you think these technologies have failed to materialize?

In your opinion, what do you think is the biggest hurdle to deploying a biothreat detection and identification system in the US?

Do you have any additional comments?